Artistic Freedom and Academic Freedom by O\u27Neil, Robert M.
ARTISTIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*
I
INTRODUCTION
The Cincinnati, Ohio, jury surely did the right thing by rejecting obscenity
charges against Contemporary Arts Center Director Dennis Barrie following
the exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs.' Yet a different
outcome at that trial might have forced higher courts to consider to what
degree the fine arts enjoy protection under the first amendment, an issue that
has been curiously neglected in the evolution of freedom of expression. First
amendment protection of artistic expression and several related questions
affecting both free expression generally and academic freedom in particular
deserve more attention than they have received. These questions are the
focus of this article.
The article addresses academic and artistic freedom from three
perspectives. Part II discusses the constitutional status of an artist's freedom
to create. Part III analyzes an artist's freedom to display or perform his or her
works, particularly in college and university facilities. Part IV explores
complex questions of freedom in funding for the arts-including, of course,
the perplexing (and now partially resolved) debate over content restrictions
on grants from the National Endowment for the Arts.
II
FREEDOM TO CREATE
Surely the first amendment ought to protect the artist's creative process
and product as fully as it protects the spoken and printed word. Legal
scholars and practitioners of the arts have consistently assumed that art is
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1. See Kim Masters, Art Gallery Not Guilt ' of Obscenity: Cincinnati Jury Clears Mapplethorpe Exhibition
of All Charges, Washington Post AI col 4-6 (October 6, 1990). The obscenity charges were not
unexpected. Shortly before the opening of the Mapplethorpe exhibit in early April, 1990, the
Contemporary Arts Center sought an injunction against threatened prosecution, but a federal judge
declined to intervene. An arrest was made for violation of the Ohio obscenity laws soon after the
show opened, although law enforcement officers were ordered by federal courts not to interfere with
the continued display. The show went on as scheduled, with record crowds, while director Barrie
awaited the criminal trial that occurred in late September and October. State v Mapplethorpe, 90-CRB-
11699A (Cincinnati Dist Ct October 5, 1990).
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"speech." ' 2 But that assumption needs closer examination; the state of the law
is less clear than these scholars assume. Artists familiar with the current state
of the law are right to be uncomfortable. One scholar who recently reviewed
the cases summarizes current doctrine with a realistic sense of resignation:
Artistic expression has been assigned derivative and second class status in the views of
many first amendment thinkers, the Supreme Court, and other courts. [F]rom a first
amendment perspective the ideal kind of expression is political discourse, and all
other kinds of expression, including artistic expression, are accorded lower degrees of
first amendment protection depending on their similarity to political expression.
3
To test this conclusion, an independent review of the scope of first
amendment protection for artistic expression is in order. In pursuing the
constitutional question, "Is art protected?," it is necessary to bear in mind a
logically antecedent question: "What is art?" Courts are not comfortable
defining art. One recalls Justice Holmes' stern warning at the turn of the
century: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations."-4 Moreover, the very nature and concept of art is changing
rapidly-with credit (or blame) to Andy Warhol and other pioneers of new
forms of creative expression. 5 In fact, much of what shocks many viewers
about current art is more its novelty than its inherently abrasive content.
Thus it becomes progressively more difficult even for art critics, let alone
judges, to determine "what is art," 6 and this article will focus instead on the
more familiar question of whether art is protected.
The search for sources of constitutional protection of artistic expression is
not fruitful. Curiously, the Supreme Court has never defined precisely the
scope of first amendment protection for the creative and performing arts. 7
There are, however, several sources from which to glean useful hints. Nearly
forty years ago, for example, in Burstyn v. Wilson,8 the court considered the
constitutionality of a New York statute permitting the banning of motion
pictures on the ground they are "sacriligious." In striking down the statute,
the Court held without dissent that "expression by means of motion pictures
is included within the free speech and press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." 9 In so holding, the Court explained:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of
ways, varying from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
2. See, for example, Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 545-46 (Harvard Univ
Press, 1941).
3. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the
First Amendment, 1987 Wis L Rev 221, 222.
4. Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 US 239, 251 (1903).
5. See Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 Yale LJ 1359 (1990) (authored by
Amy M. Adler).
6. See Andrew Grundberg, Art Under Attack: Who Dares Say That It's .Vo Good?, New York Times
BI col 3-4 (November 25, 1990); Leonard D. DuBoff, What is Art? Toward a Legal Definition, 12
Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 303 (1990).
7. See generally Nahmod, 1987 Wis L Rev 221 (cited in note 3).
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v Wi'lson, 343 US 495 (1952).
9. Id at 502.
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shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of
motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform.'
0
Arguably that judgment, or at least its logic, went beyond film, and carried full
constitutional protection to all artistic media.''
Additional, if somewhat oblique, insight comes from cases inquiring into
obscenity. During the three decades since the Court first sought to define
obscenity and review procedures for its suppression, 12 the Justices have
stressed that judgments "in the area of freedom of speech and press ... must
always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific expression."'' A particular work can be found
obscene only if it lacks, inter alia, "serious . . .artistic . . .value."'
4
These criteria compel consideration of the artistic qualities of works
claimed to be obscene. As the outcome of the Mapplethorpe trial seems to
suggest (since much sympathetic and apparently persuasive testimony related
to the artistic qualities of Mapplethorpe's work),' 5 that mandate alone may
have considerable value to the fine arts community. It may even be that when
a given work is found to be "art," it cannot also be held obscene; the very
notion of constitutionally unprotected art may be logically untenable-at least
as far as obscenity is concerned. The same is not true under the newer child
pornography laws recently sustained by the Supreme Court; 16 much material
that may violate these laws may also have considerable artistic merit, leaving
unclear the relationship between the status of art and other exceptions to the
first amendment. In any event, obscenity cases, because they do not address
the issue, fail to provide any direct support for declaring that art is speech for
constitutional purposes. Their language sharpens the inquiry for finding
obscenity, but surely does not resolve the central issue.
Justice William 0. Douglas, apparently alone on this as on many topics,
once addressed constitutional protection of art directly. Dissenting in a 1960
case involving quite different matters, he argued that "the actor on stage or
screen, the artist whose creation is in oil or clay or marble.., are beneficiaries
of freedom of expression." 17 Yet even Justice Douglas never found the
opportunity to apply these precepts to vindicate an artist's claim of free
expression.
10. Id at 501.
1I. Later cases involving film review boards seemed to qualify that protection. See Times Film
Corp. v City of Chicago, 365 US 43 (1961).
12. See Roth v United States, 334 US 476 (1957) (first attempt of Supreme Court to define
obscenity).
13. Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973).
14. Id at 22-23.
15. Isabel Wilkerson, Obscenity Jurors Were Pulled Two Ways, New York Times A 12 col 4-6 (October
10, 1990).
16. New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982) (sustaining New York criminal statute that prohibits
persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by
distributing material that depicts such performances).
17. Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 514 (1960) (Douglas dissenting).
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Artists can also turn for support to Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad,'
a first amendment case that comes close to addressing protection of artistic
expression. In holding that a city could not exclude from a public auditorium
performances of the rock musical "Hair," at least not without fairly elaborate
procedural safeguards, the Court felt called upon to discuss briefly the nature
of the activity the city authorities had summarily barred.19 The arbitrary and
subjective basis the city gave for barring the musical would have sufficed, said
the majority, "only if we were to conclude that live drama is unprotected by
the first amendment-or subject to a totally different standard from that
applied to other forms of expression." 20 No member of the Court argued that
rock musicals should be so viewed. Yet this dictum suggesting that the first
amendment protects artistic expression was not without an important
limitation: "Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for first
amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems."' 2  This addendum offers at least some basis for the artist's fear
that creative and performing arts enjoy less than the full protection afforded
the spoken and printed word.
Even in the lower courts, the case law is surprisingly meager, and the
judicial views are in less than perfect accord. 22 As recently as 1988, a federal
appeals court sustained the removal of Richard Serra's "Tilted Arc" from
Manhattan's Federal Plaza. 23 In so doing, the court would do no more than
concede that "artwork, like other non-verbal forms of expression, may under
some circumstances constitute speech for first amendment purposes.."24
So grudging a view of the creative arts is not unique. An earlier federal
appeals court upheld the removal of controversial art from gallery space in a
state university student center.25 The judgment reflected, in major part, the
court's disparaging view of the paintings that provoked the dispute. Without
deciding what degree of deference judges ought in principle to give to works
of art, the court found the claim for protection weak in part because "there is
18. 420 US 546 (1975).
19. Id at 569-72. A ruling in favor of the show's promoters would have required the Court to do
no more than fault the city's shoddy procedures; glaring deficiencies in the way requests for
auditorium space were handled made it unnecessary to decide whether or not the proposed use of
the facility was clearly entitled to first amendment protection.
20. Id at 557.
21. Id, citing Burstyn, 343 US at 503.
22. See, for example, Ralph E. Lerner &Judith Bresler, Art Law: The Guide for Collectors, Investors,
Dealers and Artists 315-23 (Practicing Law Institute, 1989).
23. "Tilted Arc," commissioned and underwritten by the General Services Administration, was
installed on the Federal Plaza in downtown Manhattan in 1981. It was an arc of steel 120 feet long,
12 feet tall, and several inches thick. It soon became an object of intense public debate and criticism
because of its enormous size, and because it was designed to rust over time. After a public hearing in
1985, at which the sculptor was allowed to explain his views on the piece, the GSA decreed its
removal, though insisting it "made no judgment whatsoever concerning the aesthetic value of the
Tilted Arc." The removal order was ultimately sustained. See Serra v United States General Services
Admin., 847 F2d 1045, 1048 (2d Cir 1988); Richard Serra, Art and Censorship, 14 Nova L Rev 323
(1990); Richard Serra, Tilted Art Destroyed, 14 Nova L Rev 385 (1990).
24. Serra, 847 F2d at 1048.
25. Close v Lederle, 424 F2d 998 (1st Cir 1970), rev'g 303 F Supp 1109 (D Mass 1969). For the
facts of the dispute and lower court decision, see text accompanying notes 48-49.
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no suggestion that, unless in its cheap titles, plaintiff's art was seeking to
express political or social thought."2 6 The court then compared the paintings
before it to campus speaker bans, which in its view "involve a medium and
subject matter entitled to greater protection than plaintiff's art." 2 7 The
implication seems clear and is consistent with the scholarly view cited
earlier: 28 art that conveys a political message or theme stands markedly
higher in the constitutional order than art that is "merely art," however great
its critical acclaim or its aesthetic appeal.
For example, a federal district court assessing a controversial sculpture
stated that "the art form involved in this case constitutes speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment and thus is entitled to constitutional
protection" 29-a statement that drew its principal support from the broad
protection espoused in Southeastern Promotions. Moreover, the challenged
sculpture embodied a primarily political message-in fact, political caricature
of a kind that may be entitled to protection almost without regard to the
medium of expression in which it appears. 30
The Seventh Circuit, however, has been less willing to distinguish political
and nonpolitical art. Several years ago, Judge Richard Posner observed that
"freedom of speech and of the press protected by the first amendment has
been interpreted to embrace purely artistic as well as political expression...
unless the artistic expression is obscene in its legal sense"3 1-although the
court went on to hold that an artist could not resist a state college's relocation
of his controversial art works from a highly visible campus gallery.
One can find a few other references to the constitutional status of artists
and their works, but they are essentially cumulative. There seems to be a
fairly firm consensus that art that conveys a political message is fully
protected. Works whose merit is "exclusively artistic" sometimes fare less
well. Such a dual standard may find little historic or philosophical support,3 2
but has proved remarkably durable and quite hard to dislodge.
Neither artists nor constitutional scholars concerned about the arts should
take much comfort from the way this issue has been addressed. While no
court has squarely rejected first amendment protection for the creative and
performing arts, that fact offers small solace indeed-especially in view of the
protection that seems to have been extended to such less ennobling media of
communication as nude and topless dancing. 33 The arts, and those who
26. Id at 990.
27. Id.
28. See note 3 and accompanying text.
29. Sefick v City of Chicago, 485 F Supp 644, 648 (ND Ill 1979).
30. See, for example, Yorty v Chandler, 13 Cal App 3d 467, 91 Cal Rptr 709 (1971).
31. Piarowski v Chicago Community College, 759 F2d 625, 628 (7th Cir 1985).
32. Indeed, there is very early evidence of an assumption that artistic expression was of a rather
high order and thus arguably entitled to protection. Zechariah Chafee cites a declaration of the
Continental Congress in 1774 that basic freedom would include "the advancement of truth, science,
morality and arts in general." Chafee, Free Speech in the United States at 545 (cited in note 2).
33. See, for example, Schad v Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 US 61 (1981).
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create and study them, deserve better in a society whose liberty is centrally
tied to artistic as well as political expression.
One might simply continue to assume that, when and as necessary, the arts
will get their due. Suggestions to the contrary are relatively few, and appear
only in dicta 34 -though, for that matter, even the sympathetic statements
seem to accompany judgments adverse to the artist and thus represent largely
Pyrrhic victories. Alternatively, one could hope that litigation of these issues
will eventually compel the courts to address an issue that has too long been
left to implication. If, for example, the director of Cincinnati's Contemporary
Arts Center had been convicted on obscenity charges for displaying the
Mapplethorpe photographs, higher courts in Ohio would have been forced to
appraise the medium of expression and to define much more clearly the
extent of first amendment protection to which it is entitled.
Anything less than full first amendment protection for the arts seems
anathema. To limit full protection to "political" speech would create an
anomaly; a political cartoon with modest artistic value or a crude political
sculpture would be fully protected, while an internationally recognized work
of fine art would not be. Moreover, such a distinction would imply that even
the finest and most widely acclaimed work of art makes little or no
contribution to civic life or to the values served by democratic self-
government. To that suggestion, Alexander Meikeljohn has given the most
persuasive answer:
[T]here are many forms of thought and expression within the range of human
communication from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to
human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible,
a ballot should express.[ 3 5]
[The] people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems, "because they will
be called upon to vote." 3
6
III
FREEDOM TO PERFORM AND DIsPLAY WORKS OF ART
On the issue of the artist's right to display and perform controversial
works, there is more direct law, and the results seem a bit more consistent.
Yet here, too, the guidance provided by these results is less clear than the
historic importance of the creative arts warrants.
A. The "Performance" Cases
Perhaps the easiest cases have been those arising on a college or university
campus. Two recent cases involve a film 3 7 and a play.3 8 In both cases, state
college officials cancelled the performances on the basis of off-campus
34. For example, Close, 424 F2d at 990.
35. Alexander Meikeljohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup Ct Rev 245, 256.
36. Id at 263 (quoting Professor Harry Kalven).
37. Brown z, Bd. of Regents, 640 F Supp 674 (D Neb 1986).
38. DiBona v Matthews, 269 Cal Rptr 882 (Cal App 1990).
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criticism of their content. In each case, the courts held firmly in favor of the
right to hold such performances, and thus added importantly to the stature of
the performing arts.39
Brown v. Board of Regents involved a film scheduled to be shown at a theater
in the art gallery of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln. The film in
question was "Hail Mary," the most recent film directed byJean-Luc Godard.
Its most controversial feature-that which evoked the charge of blasphemy-
was a contemporary picturing of the birth of Christ. Protest against the film
came from persons outside the campus, including a state senator who berated
the theater director because some of her constituents thought the film
sacrilegious or blasphemous. The director's superior bowed to this external
pressure and cancelled the showing. A group of would-be viewers of the film
promptly took the issue to federal court. 40
The immediate result may well be less important than the reasoning and
the broader implications for freedom of artistic display and performance
within the academic community. In assessing the dispute, the court relied on
a recent Supreme Court decision regarding the removal of books from school
libraries, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School v. Pico.4 1 In Pico, the
Supreme Court established firm and protective first amendment principles on
that subject.42 The Court noted that the academic setting of Brown, in fact,
made bowing to external political or religious pressure even less acceptable:
"Even if the cause had been only the fact of controversy ...cancellation
would not have been justified, because action taken by an arm of the state
merely to avoid controversy from the expression of ideas is an insufficient
basis for interfering with the right to receive information." 43
Several factors may, however, modify the scope of this important decision.
First, regardless of the content of the film, its artistic merit, or its message, the
reason given for the cancellation was highly suspect. Thus the court might
simply have concluded that a state university had no business banning any
activity arguably protected by the first amendment in response to such
pressures; such a holding would have avoided consideration of the degree of
protection the film warranted. Second, film as a medium of expression had by
this time received a substantial measure of first amendment protection. 44
Thus, such a decision upholding the right to show a controversial film may
not extend fully or easily to forms of expression litigated less frequently.
Finally, the religious content or theme of the film may have afforded a
measure of constitutional status that would not necessarily attach to art
treating other themes, or to art lacking such a focus or message.
39. Brown, 640 F Supp at 681-82; DiBona, 269 Cal Rptr at 890-91.
40. Brown, 640 F Supp at 676-78.
41. 457 US 853 (1972).
42. Id at 871.
43. Brown, 640 F Supp at 679.
44. Kingsley International Picture Corp. v Regents, 360 US 684 (1959).
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The other case 45 examining freedom of performance occurred later and
potentially provides more protection to artists. A California junior college
theater instructor chose for his class a play that treated race relations in a
highly charged fashion. It included "a flurry of racial slurs and epithets" 46
just before a black police officer fatally shot a white suspect on stage.
Community pressure, here too fueled partly by religious groups, caused the
college administration to cancel performance of the play, even as a class
exercise. A group of prospective playgoers sued to enjoin the ban.
In preventing the administrators from cancelling the performance, the
court relied on the basic principles of Brown: strong community pressure
would not justify banning from the campus controversial ideas, values, or
views, even when embodied in an artistic medium rather than in lecture or
newspaper form. The court also noted that the inappropriateness of the ban
was even clearer here than in Brown, because cancellation of the play went to
the heart of a college course, rather than simply limiting the extracurricular
offerings of a campus theater.47
B. The "Display" Cases
Although these performance cases are consistent, and help to broaden
protection of the arts, the same cannot so readily be said of cases involving
exhibitions in university galleries. An early example, Close v. Lederle,48
involved removal by the University of Massachusetts at Amherst of an art
exhibit from the student union. The exhibit, the work of a junior faculty
member, was originally welcomed, but later was deemed by the university
administration to be "inappropriate" after complaints about its presence in a
heavily travelled corridor. The faculty member claimed the removal violated
his first amendment rights. The district court was sympathetic, and ordered
the administration to reinstate the exhibit. 49 The court held the university art
gallery to be a public forum. Since the artist had complied with the
procedural rules for use of the forum, and since there was nothing
"inappropriate" in the paintings, the judge found the removal of the paintings
to be a violation of the artist's first amendment rights. Yet the court of
appeals reversed, in part because of the view that wholly artistic expression
deserves less protection than political expression. 50 But the reviewing court
also paid exceptional deference to the administration's judgment about what
was "appropriate" or "inappropriate" for display in a well-travelled campus
corridor.5 1
Close may have been biased by another factor: the paintings hung in a
corridor through which many campus visitors could not help but pass-
45. DiBona, 269 Cal Rptr at 882.
46. Id at 889.
47. Id.
48. 303 F Supp 1109.
49. Id at 1120.
50. Close, 424 F2d at 990.
51. Id.
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among them impressionable school children. To the court, that factor may
have been the strongest basis for invoking a higher canon of taste: "Where
there was, in effect, a captive audience, [the university administration] had a
right to afford protection against 'assault upon individual privacy' . . . short of
legal obscenity."-5 2
Thus, a public art display may set in motion a conflict between two sets of
interests, demanding an accommodation not needed in the film and play
cases. Art exhibits in highly visible spaces cannot so easily be avoided or
bypassed by potentially surprised or offended viewers; that fact alone makes
more complex the artist's claim to the right to display his work, whatever
might be said of the antecedent interest in creating the work, or even (as in
the case of the play) presenting the art to a class of his own for their
comments or evaluation.
The other gallery case, Piarowski v. Chicago Community College,53 reaches, if
with somewhat greater care, a consistent conclusion. An Illinois junior
college art instructor was ordered by the administration to relocate three
stained glass windows he had created for public display as part of an annual
faculty exhibit. When the artist went to court, a decade and a half after Close,
he found a more sensitive view of artistic expression, but fared no better in
the end.
The court assumed, but saw no need to decide, that artistic expression
enjoyed both first amendment protection and the full benefit of academic
freedom. 54 Two elements in the case, however, enabled the court to decide
that no violation of the faculty member's first amendment rights had occurred
when the adminstration ordered relocation of the windows. First, the college
had properly cited a deep concern for the effects such an exhibit might have
on its ability to recruit students. 55 Second, the display was prominently
visible: "the offending windows could be seen by people not actually in the
gallery." 56 These factors helped to justify imposing canons of taste higher
than the legal test of obscenity, thereby allowing the windows' relocation.
The critical question raised by the gallery cases is whether it is the medium
or the setting that is constitutionally dispositive. Despite the uncertain status
given the creative arts in both cases, the critical factor seems to be the location
52. Id. Compare Applegate v Dumke, 25 Cal App 3d 304, 101 Cal Rptr 645 (1972), a factually
somewhat similar case that did not address the constitutional issue because of an apparent waiver of
the artist's claims against a state university ban on the display of his works.
53. 759 F2d at 628.
54. Id at 629.
55. The court described the exhibit as follows:
One depicts the naked rump of a brown woman, and sticking out from (or into) it a white
cylinder that resembles a finger but on careful inspection is seen to be a jet of gas. Another
window shows a brown woman from the back, standing, naked except for stockings, and
apparently masturbating. In the third window another brown woman, also naked except for
stockings and also seen from the rear, is crouching in posture of veneration before a robed
white male whose most prominent feature is a grotesquely outsized phallus (erect penis)
that the woman is embracing.
Id.
56. Id at 630.
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of the exhibit-evoking the court's concern in one case for possible assault on
a captive audience including school children, and in the other a concern that
visible and offensive art works pre-empted prime campus gallery space for the
display of material of less than universal appeal.
Such tensions are not confined to the courts or to constitutional
judgments. They must also play a part in defining the extent and nature of
academic freedom for the creative arts. The final report of last spring's
Conference on Academic Freedom and Artistic Expression, after a
resounding endorsement of maximum freedom for the creative process,
addressed just the issue with which we have been dealing.57 The report
closed by striking a somewhat different balance than the courts:
When academic institutions offer exhibitions or performances to the public, they
should ensure that the rights of the presenters and the audience are not impaired by a
"heckler's veto" from those who may be offended by the presentation. Academic
institutions should ensure that those who choose to view or attend may do so without
interference. Mere presentation in a public place does not create a "captive
audience." Institutions may reasonably designate specific places as generally available
or unavailable for exhibits or performances.
58
How might such a view have altered the outcome of the Massachusetts and
Illinois gallery cases? The report suggests, unlike the courts, that offense
taken at a particular work, or fear that someone may take offense, would not
justify removing the work once in place. But the report also recognizes that a
generalized concern that student or faculty exhibits might contain
controversial works would presumably justify a general policy that consigns
them to a less prominent site. 59
Finally, the conference report argues that presentation in a public place
does not, by itself, create a captive audience. 60 It seems, though, to leave
open the possibility that such a condition might occur, and that, if it did,
appropriate steps might be taken, consistent with the artist's freedom and the
institution's own integrity. 6'
Thus, judgments of constitutional law and ideal precepts of academic
freedom diverge on this issue-despite Judge Posner's effort at assimilating
the two standards in the course of rejecting the Illinois college instructor's
claim in Piarowski.62 The differences are, however, not so much on matters of
principle-whether, for example, artistic expression is entitled to full
protection-as on such issues as the degree of deference due a college's
desire to shield visiting school children or to sustain its capacity to recruit
future students.
The latter concerns may indeed generate institutional interests of a rather
high order. The courts find them persuasive-superior not to the artist's
interest in creating or exhibiting controversial works as such, but rather to the
57. The report is reprinted in 76 Academe 13 (July-August 1990).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 759 F2d 625.
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artist's wish not to have those works removed from the prominent location
where the institution originally put them on display. A statement of principles
of academic freedom would recognize the institution's dilemma but would
insist that it be resolved in a different way-either by demanding that visitors
be more tolerant, or by not committing such prominent space to potentially
controversial work in the first place.
IV
FREEDOM TO OBTAIN FUNDING
The third area of inquiry, constitutional limits on funding restrictions for
the arts, may be the most difficult, and certainly is the most current. It has
also elevated the arts to an unaccustomed level of political visibility and
controversy. After a year and a half of sparring, the basic status of funding for
the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA")-and the inescapable corollary
issue of content restrictions on NEA-funded art works-were resolved in late
October in what appears to be a generally satisfactory compromise. 63
In place of the Helms Amendment, 6 4 a new grant-evaluation formula
appears with two elements. The first is a simple (if ominous) declaration: in
the broad provisions that cover grant-making, Congress has now directed the
NEA to take into account "general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 65 Such language seems to
have no independent operative force, and would at most guide panels and
agency officers among various desiderata to be applied in the review of
proposals. Moreover, a spokesman for the endowment said soon after the
congressional compromise that this language on "decency" was
"nonbinding."66
In its more detailed provisions, the new approach also represents a vast
improvement over the Helms Amendment, which during its brief life both
constrained and politicized the endowment. Gone from the new
reauthorization is the Helms Amendment's restrictive language, which
included terms that were imprecise and legally undefined and thus almost
certainly unconstitutional. 6 7  Artists seeking grants under the Helms
Amendment were required to swear by oath that they would not transgress
lines bounded by such terms as "sadomasochism" and "homoeroticism," and
would not create or display works showing "individuals engaged in sex
acts."'6 8 The oath took the form of a certification requirement to the "Request
for Advance or Reimbursement." The new section of this form required
63. Pub L No 101-512, § 103(b) (1990), amending 20 USC § 954(d).
64. Pub L No 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat 741 (1990), amending 20 USC § 954. For a discussion
of its provisions, see notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
65. Pub L No 101-512 § 103(b).
66. Christopher Myers, Arts Backers are Pleased by Congress' 3 Year Reauthorization of NEA without
Restrictions, Chron Higher Educ A19 col 4 (November 7, 1990).
67. See Pub L No 101-121 § 304(a); see also note 71.
68. Id. See HR Conf Rep No 101-264, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 264 (1990). See also Stephen F.
Rohde, Art of the State. Congressional Censorship of the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 Hastings Comm
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recipients to certify to compliance with certain "General Terms and
Conditions for Organizations Grant Recipients." Paragraph Two of the
Terms and Conditions contained language drawn directly from section
304(a). Therefore, in order for any grant funds to be released, the recipient
had to certify in advance that none of the funds would be used "to promote,
disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of the NEA ... may
be considered obscene." 69
The change in the locus of decision seems at least as significant an
improvement as the terminology. Under the Helms Amendment, the NEA
was empowered to determine what was and was not obscene before making
grants. 70 In a field where scrupulous adherence to procedure has always been
a quid pro quo for substantive restraint, the notion of inviting a grant-making
agency to set its own standards on obscenity seemed especially abhorrent.
Doubtless that informal process would have been enjoined by the courts had
any of the several constitutional challenges to the Helms Amendment come to
trial before the reauthorization. 7'
Under the congressional compromise, it is now clear that judgments about
obscenity in the arts must be made by the courts. The standards to be applied
are those that judges have fashioned over a period of more than three
decades. 72 The agency is empowered to seek recovery of a related grant only
if a grant recipient is later convicted of an obscenity or child pornography
charge. Grant recipients are no longer required to certify under oath that
they will adhere to and enforce the statutory ban on any use of NEA funds for
purposes the agency "may consider" obscene. 73
The new 1990 reauthorization approach thus seems a major improvement
in both substance and procedure. It removes the most intrusive and
demeaning content restriction provisions of the Helms Amendment, and frees
a benign agency from the role of policing grant recipients, which is especially
important because the NEA must have the confidence of the arts community if
it is to carry out the mission given it by Congress a quarter century ago.
The substitute approach is not, however, without potential problems.
Reauthorization of the NEA with no content restrictions would have been
preferable not only to artists and some members of Congress, but also to a
most thoughtful bipartisan presidential commission that filed its report
& Ent L J 353, 365 (1990); Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political
Control, 103 Harv L Rev 1969 (1990).
69. Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v Frohnmayer, 59 USLW 2436 (CD Cal 1991).
70. Pub L No 101-121, § 304(a).
71. While the Helms Amendment dealt in part with "obscene" material, and to that extent
rested on firm and well-defined constitutional ground, the other key terms were not defined in the
amendment or elsewhere, and thus would quite surely have been found vague or overbroad or both
under well-settled first amendment principles. Thus, not surprisingly, the one case that has come to
judgment reached just such a conclusion. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation, 59 USLW 2436.
72. See Part 11.
73. The NEA announced soon after passage of the reauthorization that it would no longer
require grant recipients to sign a pledge of the kind that had been imposed during the previous year.
Kim Masters, .NEA Drops Obscenity Pledge; Arts Agency Decision Follows Hill Action, Washington Post C I col
1 (October 30, 1990).
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shortly before Congress acted on the NEA's future. 74 In its key section, the
commission recommended "against legislative changes to impose specific
restrictions on the content of works of art supported by the Endowment. ' 75
The report continued: "Content restrictions may raise serious constitutional
issues, would be inherently ambiguous and would almost certainly involve the
Endowment and the Department of Justice in costly and unproductive
lawsuits. "76
Some may argue that the new congressional approach does not even
involve content restrictions, but simply the addition of a sanction for the
violation of existing and constitutionally valid obscenity laws. Yet the effects
of the new approach for the sensitive and conscientious artist may also be
quite different from the effect that would have followed from reauthorization
lacking such language and collateral sanctions.
In four specific ways, the reauthorization may still deter or make anxious
the scrupulous creative person who seeks NEA support. The first and perhaps
most obvious effect flows from the prominent reference to "decency." ' 77
Despite the endowment's assurance that such language is nonbinding, and
despite the absence of any enforcement provision or penalty, some members
of the arts community find it not only offensive but ominous as well. The
editor of the Kenyon Review, for example, calls the "decency" phrase
"dangerously vague" and "incredibly ambiguous. " 78 She adds: "Although
you don't have to sign anything, it once again leaves open a broad area that
was never in question in the past." 79 Surely a conscientious artist might be
uneasy both about the contours of "decency" and about their possible
application to his or her creative works. Whether such anxiety attains
constitutional stature remains, of course, a difficult question.
A second risk is the potential chilling effect created by the new approach to
grant eligibility. While the judgment about what is obscene now rests with
the courts, the sensitive and conscientious artist might well be fearful about
the new collateral sanction the reauthorization creates. Such fears would be
heightened by the state of the law reviewed earlier, and the uncertain basis of
74. Press release accompanying Independent Commission's Report to Congress on the National
Endowment for the Arts (September 11, 1990) (on file with author); see also Kim Masters, Don't
Restrict NEA, Panel Tells Congress, Report Urges Exclusion of Anti-Obscenity Language, Washington Post B I
col 1 (September 12, 1990).
75. Independent Commission Report to Congress at 2 (cited in note 74).
76. Id at 89.
77. Pub L No 101-512 § 103(b).
78. See Myers, Chron Higher Educ at A23 col 2 (cited in note 66). In March 1991, a group of
performing artists and an artists' organization filed suit in federal court, with the support of the
American Civil Liberties Union, alleging the unconstitutionality of the "general standards of
decency" provision in the 1990 reauthorization. The suit argues that such a standard impermissibly
restricts freedom of expression of grantees and applicants.
79. Id. The next week the NEA panel that reviews grants in the field of theater and drama asked
for clarification of the term "decency" before its December meeting. Kim Masters, NEA Panel Seeks
Decency Ruling, Washington Post C2 col 1-2 (November 15, 1990). Later, the panel that reviews
proposals from artist-run organizations asked for assurance that "decency" will not be used as a
criterion in judging grant applications despite the new language. Kim Masters, What Makes for
Decency? Panel Seeks Clear Vording, Washington Post C4 col 1-3 (November 27, 1990).
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artists' expressive and creative freedoms. Until a few months ago, an
established artist would probably have assumed that his or her works were
immune from obscenity charges, and that, since no such charges had been
brought in recent times, an NEA grant was quite secure.
The prosecution of Cincinnati's Contemporary Arts Center over the
Mapplethorpe exhibit-despite the outcome-squarely challenges that
assumption. However unusual the circumstances, artists can no longer
dismiss the possibility of criminal jeopardy. Creative persons are bound to
think twice before testing the limits of taste and decorum. The world of art
will suffer from any such diminution of creative spirit.
A third danger is that museums and galleries may be less venturesome in
seeking or displaying bold and controversial works. The events in Cincinnati
again supply an illustration: the Mapplethorpe exhibit, as well as the artist,
had received NEA support.8 0 Therefore, a gallery might be forced to forfeit
an NEA grant if its director were convicted on charges like those filed against
Barrie. Under those conditions, greater caution might be predicted on the
part of those galleries that can least afford to forfeit government grants
precisely because they tend to test the limits of taste by displaying the avant
garde. Here too the world of creative art may stand to lose in the chillier
climate that follows the compromise.
There is a fourth and final, if somewhat subtler, risk. Those who pressed
so hard to make the NEA an administrative censor are not likely to retreat
from the field because they lost this battle. In fact, it is quite possible to
imagine all NEA grantees now becoming targets of self-appointed guardians
of decency and propriety searching for evidence of obscenity in funded works.
This is a frightening prospect indeed. It recalls vigilante movements of earlier
and unhappy times in our national life, when the demon was sought in
politics 8' rather than in art. But the parallel is uncomfortably close, and the
potential chilling effect of private activity may be potentially greater even than
that of government policy or prosecution.
Such risks and hazards do not, of course, make a constitutional case. They
do, however, set the stage for possible challenges to the far less troubling
language that replaced the Helms Amendment. 2 Surely such a challenge
would not be averted by Senator Helms' own claim that "refusing to subsidize
something does not 'ban' it. '"83 The body of law dealing with unconstitutional
conditions is far too advanced to permit any branch of government to hide
80. See Rohde, 12 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ at 360 (cited in note 68).
81. John P. Roche, The Quest for the Dream 67-72 (Macmillan, 1963) (recounting the Palmer raids
and the post-World War I anti-communist movements).
82. Compare favorably AdvocatesforArts v Thompson, 532 F2d 792, 797 (1st Cir 1976), a case that
approaches this issue on its facts, in which the court expressed concern about New Hampshire's
denial of a state grant to a literary magazine on the basis of one controversial poem, but declined to
intervene on constitutional grounds in the magazine's favor.
83. See Jesse Helms, Art, the First Amendment and the NEA Controversy: Tax-Paid Obscenity, 14 Nova
L Rev 317, 320 (1990).
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behind distinctions between conditioned benefits and direct sanctions. 84
More troublesome is the unavoidable truth that government cannot possibly
fund every applicant or subsidize every work of art, and must therefore adopt
and apply some neutral selective criteria.
Dean Geoffrey Stone poses the dilemma in this way:
Although government may not ban offensive art, it does not necessarily follow that it
must therefore subsidize such art. Surely, government is under no constitutional
obligation to establish the NEA in the first place. Why, then, if it chooses to fund
some art, should it be precluded from exercising reasonable judgment about the types
of art it will support? For example, although government cannot ban "bad" art, it
surely is under no constitutional obligation to fund "bad" art, even if it supports
"good" art. Why, then, must government fund art that denigrates religion or
promotes unlawful or undesirable conduct, or is inappropriate for children, or deeply
offends others? There is a common sense difference between suppression and failing
to subsidize, and government must have greater discretion in the latter situation than
in the former.
85
Dean Stone then offers his own compelling reply to a question he knows is not
entirely rhetorical:
Reasonableness is not and cannot be, the constitutional standard for government
efforts to restrict speech because the message is unwise, disagreeable, harmful or
offensive. To the contrary, if there is a central principle in our first amendment
jurisprudence, it is that government ordinarily may not restrict expression for such
reasons, for such suppression distorts public debate, mutilates the thought process of
the community, violates the equality of status in the field of ideas and elevates the
government to the role of platonic censor.
8 6
The crucial question remains: if government cannot fund all artists or all
works, how must it choose? If it makes choices, it must adopt and apply
standards. And if those standards are not simply broad and bland
categories-for example, fund only oil paintings but not water colors, support
metal sculpture but not plastic, favor portraits over landscapes-then there is
inevitable potential for content differentiation. The difficulty is deciding
when that differentiation abridges or inhibits freedom of expression in ways
the first amendment will not allow.
Three further observations may help identify possible constitutional
issues. It is only artists among all government grantees who forfeit benefits if
they are convicted of violating obscenity laws;8 7 a public employee, a
scholarship holder, a public housing tenant-apparently anyone else who
receives government support-would be immune. It is true that obscenity is
more closely related to the nature of an NEA grantee's work and status than is
the case for most other government beneficiaries. But consider then the other
dimension of the grid: no other transgression by an NEA grantee would
84. See, for example, Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 Cornell L Rev 1185 (1990), and the many materials cited there.
85. Address by Geoffrey Stone at Loop Luncheon, 16-17 (October 18, 1990) (transcript on file
with author).
86. Id at 19.
87. But compare 18 USC § 1464 (1990), under which licensed broadcast stations may incur
collateral sanctions for the broadcasting of obscene (as well as "indecent" or "profane") material on
the air. See FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978).
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cause the loss of the grant. If, for example, an artist is convicted of fraudulent
art sales, or of selling drugs in the studio, or of disposing of toxic chemicals
improperly, the NEA grant is unaffected. Ironically, it is the law violation
most closely related to the artist's creative process-the most expressive of all
the grantee's acts-that has been singled out as the basis of possible
forfeiture. To focus in this way on artists among all government beneficiaries,
and on their expression among all possible law violations, is at least deserving
of further constitutional scrutiny.
A second possible concern relates to procedures. It is quite true that the
new reauthorization ties the sanction-potential loss of a prior grant-to a
court judgment of obscenity based on criteria that have received the Supreme
Court's blessing.8 8 Yet those obscenity criteria, and the procedures by which
they must be enforced to be constitutionally acceptable, are now to be used to
impose not one but two quite unrelated penalties on the artist/grantee. The
new approach is not unlike revoking a state university student's scholarship
after a conviction for speaking on campus and creating a clear and present
danger of lawless action, or barring from future government contracts any
professional photographer convicted of child pornography. In each case, the
primary sanction is imposed by procedures that are presumptively valid;
courts upholding those procedures did not, however, realize they were also
validating a secondary or collateral use of the primary sanction. Therein lies
the problem.
The function here of the secondary sanction is not to allow government to
avoid its obligations of due process, but rather to compound the
consequences of a single speech-related offense on the basis of procedures
designed only to support a single sanction. Courts have always been uneasy
about allowing the outcome of one proceeding to trigger automatically a
collateral consequence, even where due process was guaranteed in the
primary proceeding. Moreover, the potential chilling effect of the secondary
sanction may in this instance far exceed that of the primary sanction-if only
because the value of a revoked NEA grant (like the student's scholarship or
the photographer's access to government jobs) may be far greater than the
fine one pays for a single brush with the criminal law. Thus it is fair to ask
whether, especially in the area of expression, the procedures that have been
validated for obscenity convictions were really intended also to support the
punitive superstructure Congress has now imposed.
Finally, one must bear in mind that we are dealing with obscenity, in all its
vagaries. When one considers the potential for regional variations in
outcomes under the "community standards" formula,8 9 one might also ask
whether the primary proceeding was intended to sustain such grave collateral
consequences as the reauthorization contemplates. An artist creates a work in
one city, but that work may eventually find its way before a jury in a much less
enlightened community. That jury, applying its standards, may years later
88. Miller v California, 413 US 15, 33 (1973).
89. Id.
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cause the forfeiture of an NEA grant made to the artist in a vastly different
environment.
'It is far from clear whether any of these concerns alone, or all of them
taken together, create doubts of constitutional magnitude. They are,
however, worth exploring and bearing in mind as we watch the new NEA
legislation take effect. The day may come when such arguments will need to
be made. We cannot, after all, assume that every jury will be as reasonable as
the one in Cincinnati.
V
CONCLUSION
Artistic freedom plays a potentially major role in shaping and safeguarding
academic freedom. While the extent of constitutional protection for artistic
expression remains surprisingly spare and imprecise, the case for such
protection seems compelling. That protection should encompass the creative
and performing arts in measure comparable to protection for the spoken and
printed word, and for recognized media such as film. Protection for artistic
expression must not be confined to the creation of works of art, but should
extend also to the display, exhibition and performance of those works. To the
same extent, government funding for the arts should not attempt to restrict
an artist's freedom. Though government is under no duty to fund art at all,
once it decides to do so, it may not use that funding to deprive the recipient of
otherwise protected freedoms of expression. Artists, like speakers and
writers, are engaged in an activity that properly claims, and deserves, the
fullest measure of constitutional recognition.
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